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The effects of financialmarket performance on the rate and
distribution of economic growth is an issue which has long been
debated L–2, 3, 7_i. Since the financialmarkets play a central role
in both the mobilization of saving and the allocation of investment
funds, any imperfectionwhich occurs in these markets must influence
the saving and investment flow and thus indirectly the course of
economic growth. Although this seems to be a rather obvious proposition,
evidence on either the nature of financial market imperfectionsor
their impacts on growth is difficult to obtain. In a paper by
Darrell ~–2_T it is concluded that there does not appear to be “any
systematic relationship between ... style of banking structure and ...
tempo of economic growth.”
In this paper, arguments and evidence is presented which leads
the author to conclude that the structure and imperfectionsof the
financial markets does influence the course of economic growth. In
particular, it is concluded that due to a monopoly structure in rural
banking, an agricultural credit system which has helped induce a
labor saving agricultural technology, and private and public flow of
funds that impediments to rural development and Incentives for rural
~/ Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University of Minnesota.-2-
out migration have been created. Although this is only one of a number
of forces operating to cause the post war growth pattern? this financial
structure is a key causative element and must be dealt with to initiate
a successful rural development strategy.
Central to this argument is the demonstration that a financial
market restraint in the form of a rural banking monopoly is binding.
Thus the next section will develop analyticallyand test empirically
the implications of monopoly performance in banking. Then given this
basic restraint, and some well known features of the rural economy,
the general proposition on rural growth is developed.
I. Banking Monopoly and Performance
It is a well known feature of U.S. banking that rural banks tend
to have lower loan-to-depositratios than urban banks L-6, 8_7.
Table 1 which summarizes key banking statistics for the Upper Midwest
2/ region- by rural to urban categories aptly indicates this. L/D
ratios are approximately ten percent lower in the O-999 population
located banks than in the largest urban reserve city banks.
Several explanations have been proposed for this. There are
those who maintain that because of the unit banking structure and
limited banking competition in the rural community that the low L/D
ratios reflect the monopoly power of rural banks in the loan market.
Others, still relating the low L/D ratios to a supply problem,
point out that rural banks have an asset diversificationproblem
since such a large percentage of their assets are tied to a single
~/ The data was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.























































































































































agricultural area. The natural response to such a portfolio risk
problem is to diversify by reducing the percent of portfolio in loans
and increasing that in bonds. Finally, a third group insists that
the problem has its root in inadq~ti loan demand derived from the
lack of investment opportunities in the rural area.
As stated, and by merely looking at the descriptive data, there
is no way to distinguish between these alternative explanations. Indeed,
it appears that, perhaps, a little bit of all three are involved. For
instance, one of the most pronounced rural to urban trends evident in
Table 1, is the very sharp reduction in the percent of agricultural
loans from 59% and 71% in the most rural located banks to approximately
1 percent in the larger urban reserve city banks.
Of course, people have been talking about the lack of opportunity
in the rural areas for years. What is involved here is what economists
refer to as a classic identificationproblem or how to distinguish
between effects of supply and that of demand. In what follows, applying
the theory of monopoly to banking, I will show how it is possible to
distinguish these. In order to do this, I must reformulate the problem.
If the monopoly explanation is correct, than we are observing a
reduction in L/D ratio due to an increase in monopoly power. To
derive the implications of this, it is only necessary to compare a bank
operating competitivelywith a bank operating monopolistically in the
loan market.
Figure 1 presents a hypothetical conunercial bank loan market in
relative terms under conditions of monopoly. Notice the horizontal
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Figure 1: The Commercial Bank Relative Loan Market under Conditions of
Monopoly
achieves a maximum at 100 percent. Using traditionalmonopoly analysis,
the bank provides loans upto Lm percent and charges an interest rate of
rm. Under competitive conditions market supply and demand determine
the L/D ratio and as drawn this would occur at loan percent Lc and
interest rate rc. In other words, we would expect to see a decrease
in the L/D ratio and an increase in the loan interest rate associated
with an increase in monopoly power in the commercial bank loan market.
How does this differ from a situation in which the relative
demand for loans in the rural area is less than that in urban areas?A reduction in demand either
would lead to a reduction in





but also a reduction in
indicated in Figure 2. Notice that the
effect of monopoly even under conditions of reduced demand is to
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Figure 2: Commercial Bank Relative Loan Market with a Reduction in Demand
To test these alternative hypothesis about banking behavior,
cross sectional grouped data was analyzed for four states in the
Upper Midwest for the years 1960, 1964, 1968 and 1971. The data
although on an individual state basis is similar to that presented n
Table 1. Each column is treated as a separate observation. In total,-7-
there were 118 nonzero observations out of a possible 160 columns. Y
The data is characterized by state, size of town of bank location, type
of bank affiliation and date.
The following linear regression was estimated based on this data
to test the hypothesis:~/
L = 107.79 - 1.02 GS - 1.04 0s - .98 C
6 (45.897) (45.079)z (46.295)~ (22.936)~
+ .03 TD - .03 RE + .02 FL - .00 CL
(2.036)~ (1.205)~ (1.186)Y (.125)~
.95 IL + .0002 A
(7.281)~ (1.608)m
Number of observations * 118
R2 adjusted = .979692
F statistic = 628.133006
where L/D is the loan-to-depositratio. GS/A, OS/A and C/A are the





TD/D is the ratio of time to total deposits, RE/L, FL/L and
the ratios of real estate loans, farm loans and commercial
total loans while IL/L is the ratio of interest and discounts
to total loans. A/BN is the average assets per bank category.
~/ Because of space,
anyone interested
this data could not be presented here. However,
in seeing the total set can obtain a copy by
writing the author.
~/ The numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios. In general, the higher
the ratio the more s~gnificant the coefficient. For a coefficient
to be significant at the 5% level the t-ratio must be greater than
1.98.-8-
The regression estimates are interesting in several regards. The
most important for this context is that the coefficient on the interest
rate term is negative and very significant at well above the one percent
level, that is, interest rates tend to rise as the L/D ratio falls. This
strongly supports the hypothesis that monopoly power of rural banks
exceeds that of urban banks. In other words, that there is a binding
financial testraint operating in the rural community, and that It is
supply factors rather than demand which accounts for the lower L/D ratios
in rural banks.
The regression results also shed light on the issue of portfolio
diversification. None of the loan composition terms is a significant
explanatory variable for the loan-to-depositratio. The farm loan
term (FL/L) is positively related to L/D, just the reverse of its
expected sign while the coefficient of the commercial loan term (CL/L)
is approximately zero. Thus we reject the risk portfolio problem as
an explanation of low L/D ratios in rural banks at least to the degree
that the loan composition would measure this.
Based on the evidence presented in this section, we must conclude
that there is a binding financial restraint operating in the rural
community in the form of rural banking monopolies.
Financial Restraint and Rural Development
Although a supply restraint in the rural bank loan market would
in and of itself have a restrictive impact on rural development, it is
the combination of this financial restraint and other peculiar features
of the rural economy which in concert act to impede rural development-9-
and stimulate rural out migration. These other features which are
particularly relevant here are: (1) rural dependence on commercial
bank financing, (2) institutionalfactors which encourage outflows
of funds from the rural area, and (3) technical change in agriculture
which is highly labor saving and dependent on a competitive agricultural
loan market. It is to these factors which we now turn.
A. The Importance of Rural Banking
Commercial banks play a dominant role in the rural financial market.
No other institution either operates in almost all segments of the rural
economy or provides as large a share of rural credit. In agriculture,
which is probably the most competitiveof the rural loan markets,
bank loans account for approximately 25 percent of agricultural finance
both nationally and regionally ~–5~–. In the non-agriculturalrural
sector, data is not readily available. However, very few institutional
lenders outside of commercial banks operate in a significantway in
the rural non-farm area. The national money and security markets which
primarily serve large corporationsplay an insignificantpart in non-
farm rural finance. Insurance companies which at one time were an
important rural financer have been restricting their non-urban financing.
The small business administrationoperates somewhat but again because
of the ease of operation probably utilizes the preponderance of their
funds for urban financial support. Savings anclloan associationswhich
are primarily mortgage lenders are very heavily concentrated in the
urban areas of the Upper Midwest. And so on. Thus, although this must-1o-
be viewedas highly preliminary, I would propose that 50% or more of
the rural non-farm sector is dependent on bank financing.
How important is the rural non-farm sector? In the Upper Midwest
region, which is substantiallymore dependent on agriculture than the
country as a whole, 13% of total employment is in agriculturewhile
only slightlyless than half of the total population lives in large
urban metropolitan areas of 50,000 or more. Thus this rural non-farm
sector accounts for approximately one-third of total employment ~–lO_Z.
B. Other InstitutionalFactors
There are a whole set of private and public institutionalbiases
which have the tendency to generate a flow of funds from the rural to
the urban areas. Some of these flows do not appear to be moving in
response to economic factors but rather are due to the structure of
institutionsL-8, 9_T. The cumulative effect of these factors is to
further worsen the financial restraint on rural economic activity.
The most notable, if not the most important, is a common feature
of a correspondentbanking system. Rural banks hold deposits in large
urban correspondent banks in return for services performed. In the
Upper Midwest over $350 million worth of correspondentbalances were
held in Twin Cities banks as of December 1969 ~–9_~. This represented
approximately nine percent of total deposits and was concentrated in
16 metropolitan banks. No county in the two state region studied
outside of the Twin Cities had a net inflow of these balances.
A second institutional factor relates to the spatial distribution
of savings and loan associations and savings banks in the Upper-11-
Midwest. These are very heavily concentrated in the major metropolitan
areas and because of the higher interest rates paid on deposits, this
has generated a large outflow of funds from rural areas. It has been
estimated Z—4 Z that approximately $600 million worth of rural deposits
are held by Twin Cities S & L’s.
Other financial purchases on the savings side tend to lead to
outflow of rural funds although the magnitudes are difficult to estimate.
Purchases of insurance and securities
outflows. The uses of funds in these
urban sector.
might account for substantial
institutions is dominated by the
However, the movement of funds to the
financial markets is not the only way that
cities through the private
funds are redistributedaway
from the rural area. In a study of
in West Minnesota” ~–ll_7 it was
funds through the state and federal
the “Financingof Public Services
shown that the net outflow of
government taxing and expenditure
pattern was $61 million in that region alone. This seems like a
relatively small amount, but it represented almost 38 percent of state
and federal tax collections or $270 per person. If this is at all
indicative of the net impact (expenditureminus taxes) throughout the
rural area, then this is a major financial deterrent to rural development.
c. Agricultural Technology and Finance
Studies of agricultural development in the”U.S. conclude that
technical change has been highly labor saving ~–l_~. This is not a
surprising result and on an intuitive level follows from the rather
dramatic drops in labor input in U.S. agriculture. For instance, in-12-
the four states studied in this paper there was a 35.6 percent drop in
agricultural employment between 1960 and 1971 while there was a 17.9
percent increase in total employment~–10_7. The main effect of invest-
ment in agriculture has been a steady release of surplus rural labor,
a labor group which must fmd
Supportive of this trend
which provides the investment
alternative employment elsewhere.
is a competitive agricultural loan market
resources necessary for that technical
change. Central
psydo-government
to this credit market is the Farm Credit System a
agency which was set up for the sole purpose of providing
competitive credit to agriculture. Of all agricultural lenders, this
institution is growing most rapidly (regionallyat a rate exceeding 10
percent over the decade of the sixties and 14 percent between 1970-1971
~–lo_7). The key to this institutions success is heavily dependent on being
able to finance their loans through the issuance of bonds on the
national bond market at U.S. Agency rates. For instance, in the fall
of 1973 when prime lending rates were between 9.5 and 10.25%, the
Farm Credit System was lending at approximately 8.5 percent.
Conclusion
Putting together the features of the rural economy noted above,
we are now in a position to analyze the
has on rural development.
First, there is the existence of a
effects which financial restraint
rural financial restraint in
banking, the main empirical effect of which is substantially lower
loan-to-depositratios and higher interest rates. This has the effect
of restricting credit to the entire rural community, but particularly-13-
the rural non-farm sector which is heavily dependent on bank financing.
The major effect of this is an underinvesting in the rural area, a force
to reduce the rate of growth and employment creation.
Next, there are the institutionalforces which tend to move funds
into the urban areas. Again these have the effects of reducing lendable
funds for rural investment and thus further restraining the availability
of rural finance.
Lastly, there is a dynamic agriculture supported in large
measure by a competitive financial market which has resulted in a
sizable surplus labor force in the rural area.
If employment opportunities were available m the rural area,
then undoubtedly some of the surplus labor would shift from agriculture
to non-agriculturework in the rural area. Tonically, however, the
very sector which needs the financing is the most restrained and the
tendency are effects which we are all aware of -- low rural per capita
income, rural outmigration, stagnant and dying rural communities.
The factors I have analyzed in this paper are only one of a host
of forces operating in the rural area to induce these patterns. Low
social investment, poor public services, inadequate transportationand
financial restraints all combine to create these patterns. Rural
development will only occur when these disincentives for growth are
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